Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 8

6-27-2016

The Right To Destroy Under Droit D’Auteur: A Theoretical Moral
Right Or A Tool Of Art Speech?
Sofie G. Syed

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sofie G. Syed, The Right To Destroy Under Droit D’Auteur: A Theoretical Moral Right Or A Tool Of Art
Speech?, 15 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 504 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol15/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

8 SYED - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/17/16 9:45 AM

THE RIGHT TO DESTROY UNDER DROIT D’AUTEUR: A
THEORETICAL MORAL RIGHT OR A TOOL OF ART SPEECH?
SOFIE G. SYED*
In recent years, French artists have asserted the right to destroy their
own work as a dramatic means of enforcing the right to preserve the
integrity of their expression.1 In 2007, conceptual artist Daniel Buren
decried the French Ministry of Culture for allowing his famous columns at
the Palais Royal in Paris to fall into disrepair. Commenters argued that
Buren’s columns conveyed a political message symbolizing inter-party
collaboration, and that the Ministry of Culture was conveying a partisan
statement by permitting their deterioration.2 Buren’s threat to destroy his
columns received significant media coverage,3 and resulted in the
allocation of six million euros for the restoration of the work.4 In 2014,
artist Alain Mila announced that he intended to destroy one of his
sculptures, after a local politician painted the work the color of the rightwing party Front National without Mila’s consent.5 In both cases, the
government’s treatment of the work resulted in a potential threat to the
dignity of the artist, and the invocation of the right to destroy generated
public debate about the boundaries of the moral right of integrity in
practice.

* The author would like to thank Professor Tim Wu for his guidance and the Journal staff for
their hard work on this piece.
1. This right may be grounded in the rights to exclude or withdraw one’s work; authors claiming
the right to destroy in the French context have not explicitly cited a consistent legal theory. See infra
part II.
2. John Lichfield, Les Deux Plateaux: Monument to the French malaise?, INDEPENDENT (Jan.
4,
2008),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/les-deux-plateaux-monument-to-thefrench-malaise-768339.html.
3. Artist
threatens
to
take
down
columns,
UPI
(Dec.
31,
2007),
http://www.upi.com/Entertainment_News/2007/12/31/Artist-threatens-to-take-downcolumns/27321199152254/.
4. James Mackenzie & Elizabeth Pineau, Paris Palais Royal colums get 6 million euro facelift,
REUTERS
(Jan.
8,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/08/us-france-sculptureidUSTRE6074AX20100108.
5. Le maire FN de Hayange juge “sinistre” une sculpture, il la fait repeindre [The FN Mayor of
Hayange
Repaints
a
“Sinister”
Sculpture],
L’EXPRESS
(July
29,
2014),
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/le-maire-fn-de-hayange-juge-sinistre-une-sculpture-il-lafait-repeindre_1562581.html.
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In contrast to these cases, street artists who work in mediums in which
destruction of their work is inevitable reveal a different relationship to the
right to destroy, integrating destruction into their work in a way that
challenges traditional ways of viewing and commodifying art. These artists
need not formally assert a right to destroy, as the nature of the shared space
in which they produce art links destruction to the creation of new works.
Whether an artist seeks destruction to preserve a specific authorial
intent, or implicitly consents to destruction so that other artists may make
use of a shared canvas, destruction facilitates discourses on the relationship
between art and political speech. The right to destroy can serve various
purposes, which may or may not correspond to the moral rights rationale
underpinning droit d’auteur. This paper seeks to examine the intersection
of droit d’auteur and art speech, in order to compare the theory of the right
to destroy with its actual application. In practice, do French artists use this
right to gain leverage in negotiations, as a speech safeguard, as an assumed
element of particular mediums of expression, or for some other purpose?
First, I examine the history of moral rights, including the spectrum of
moral rights that is currently protected under French copyright law. Next, I
consider the potential theoretical bases for a right to destroy, using modern
examples from across Europe. Third, I analyze disputes over the predisclosure assertion of the artist’s right to destroy the work as a means of
retaining artistic control. Finally, I juxtapose the foregoing against a new
context to frame destruction—street art created on “revolving canvases”—
to demonstrate how destruction comes into play to either protect or reject
economic rights entirely.
I. DROIT D’AUTEUR AND MORAL RIGHTS
Copyright law has been justified according to a variety of rationales,
including the promotion of economic incentives, the development of
emerging industries, and the protection of the moral rights of creators. The
French droit d’auteur (right of the author), which protects “works of the
mind,” is known for its strong affiliation with the moral rights of authors.
While the moral rights component of droit d’auteur is well established, the
author’s interest in commercial exploitation of their work may be equally
compelling, and may be implicated even when the author cites moral
rationales for the assertion of a particular right. In order to understand the
relationship between the moral and economic rights theories, it is necessary
to delve into the historical development of droit d’auteur.
Droit d’auteur protects both the economic rights (droit patrimoniaux)
and moral rights (droit moral) of an author. Though “moral” appears to be
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a cognate, its meaning in French includes connotations such as “spiritual,”
“non-economic,” and “personal.”6 Droit moral is premised on a conception
of the author having a unique relationship to his work, by “infus[ing] into
his work something of his own creative personality.”7 Thus, droit d’auteur
aims to protect the personality of the author by protecting the integrity of
their work, protection that is available “by the mere fact of its creation.”8
The focus on the author’s contribution is apparent in the statutory language
of droit d’auteur. For example, originality under droit d’auteur is defined
as “a print of the author’s personality,”9 though in practice, originality is
analyzed similarly as in the United States.
French law does not just view the creative act as investing some of the
author into the work, but contextualizes it as occurring in a society whose
interests oppose those of the author.10 Droit d’auteur thus seeks to protect
the author’s work as a “gift . . . to the world,” for which the author has “a
moral right to expect that society respect his creative genius.”11 Despite its
history, the moral right aspect of droit d’auteur has been characterized as a
“mere derogation from the normal exploitation of a work.”12 Support for
this view comes from the Cour de Cassation’s conclusion that moral rights
are separate from personality rights, as well as the decision that legal
entities may exercise moral rights over a work.13 Jean-Luc Pitroaut argues
that although the French Intellectual Property Code attaches inalienable
moral rights to the author’s person, “droit moral is often exploited for
economic purposes under a remunerated waiver.”14
On the other hand, Russell DaSilva describes droit moral as “the very
core of the French droit d’auteur, for it is by virtue of the moral right that

6. Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of
French and American Copyright Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 595 (2006)
(quoting SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS: 1886–1986, at 456 (1987)).
7. Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights
in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 11 (1980).
8. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] [intellectual property code] art.
L.111-1.
9. Scott A. Cromar, Note, COPYRIGHT & MORAL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. AND FRANCE, at 8 (May
1, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898326; see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 1e civ., June 30, 1988, Bull. civ. I, 178, 2137.
10. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 11.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Piotraut, supra note 7, at 596 (quoting Professor Jacques Raynard).
13. Id. (citing Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 10,
1993, Bull. civ. I, 7, 78).
14. Id. at 614.
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an author may secure and assert his pecuniary interests.”15 The nature of
moral rights is complicated by the difficulty in categorizing certain rights
as either economic or moral. For example, the droit de suite (royalty right)
protects rights of future resales for fifty years after the author’s death.
Despite its appearance as an exploitation right, some scholars view it as a
third category of droit d’auteur based on its origins as a moral right.16
A.

History of Droit Moral

The exact origins of moral rights are often attributed to the period
preceding the French Revolution, but some scholars connect these
principles to social norms and industry customs developed far earlier.
According to Katharina de la Durantaye, though the ancient Romans had
no laws protecting authors’ rights, “powerful social norms governing
conceptions of public morals and individual honor” protected interests that
parallel modern droit moral.17 Practices respecting the author’s interests in
disclosure, attribution, and integrity of the work were common, but differed
from droit moral in that they were based on social relationships between
individuals rather than the work’s relationship to the author’s personality.
Further, these “rudimentary” protections only applied to writers, not to
other Roman artists, and were strongest for males with elite social
standing.18 Susan P. Liemer concludes that this early precursor to droit
moral “did not exist as individual, legally-protected human rights,” because
“the creative process was not protected for its own sake as the expression
of an individual’s own consciousness.”19
While scholars recognize the influence of Roman law on 19th century
French law, the act of locating the roots of droit moral in Roman law is
highly contested. Traditional Roman law was divided into three categories:
the law of persons, of property, and of obligations, none of which appeared
a proper home for legal protections afforded to authors.20 The law of
persons was inappropriate as a source of droit d’auteur, because authors’
rights were not based on rules governing the status of persons. The law of

15. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 5.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of Literary Authorship in Ancient
Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 38 (2007).
18. Id; see Susan P. Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How Non-Economic Rights Came
to be Protected in French Law, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 65, 75 n.54 (2011).
19. Liemer, supra note 19, at 76.
20. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67,
95 (2007).
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obligations was an unlikely source because authors’ rights in rem went
beyond liability rules.21 Since the law of property, as used in 19th century
law, was limited to rights in tangible things, this source was also an
unlikely basis for later droit d’auteur.22 However, Liemer presents the
relationship between de la Durantaye’s analysis and droit moral as a distant
analogy in which the dynamics of strong social norms foreshadowed
cultural developments that were eventually imported into the law. By
viewing its Roman roots in a broader historical context rather than legal
theory, Liemer presents the common strain in artistic custom as an alternate
explanation for the emergence of moral rights in droit d’auteur.
Liemer argues that the next stage in the development of preconditions
for droit moral was the establishment of artistic control over a work,
exercised by well-known artists of the Renaissance in the 16th century.
Leading into the Renaissance, works of art were not considered individual
products, due to the patronage and guild systems. As patrons and guilds
controlled the artist’s material options and training, and Christian ideals
labeled artistic inspiration as God-given, artists merely executed the work
as “craftsmen,” rather than creating it as authors.23
Prominent artists such as Michelangelo Buonarrotti and Albrecht
Dürer changed the model of artistic production. Michelangelo’s refusal to
allow the Pope to enter the Sistine Chapel while he was painting
constituted an act of control over disclosure, whereas his decision to chisel
his name into a sculpture was an assertion of attribution.24 Dürer’s use of
printing technology to reproduce and sell his famous engravings allowed
him to amass his own wealth, as he could market his work outside of the
patronage and guild systems.25 As these artists took on unprecedented
control over their work, European rulers started to grant them limited
exclusive rights in order to encourage industry development.26
According to Elizabeth Armstrong, the late 15th and early 16th
centuries saw the establishment of legal precedents enabling writers to sue
printers for control over their work.27 Authors sought not only to protect
their economic rights, but also to protect non-economic rights such as the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Liemer, supra note 19, at 76–77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 83–84 (citing ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, BEFORE COPYRIGHT: THE FRENCH BOOKPRIVILEGE SYSTEM 1498–1526, at 12–20, 55–62 (Cambridge University Press 1990)).
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reputational interest, extremely valuable in the context of the prevailing
social hierarchy. This reputational interest motivated authors to contest
misattribution and start appending their own coat of arms to a work, instead
of their patron’s coat of arms.28
The next stage in the emergence of norms supporting droit moral
occurred in La Comédie-Française under the ancien régime. Liemer posits
that the regulations concerning the Comédie-Francaise playwrights provide
“the true origins of le droit moral,”29 in contrast with the commonly
accepted view attributing droit moral to modern French philosophers. The
Comédie-Française was the most eminent repertory French theater of the
17th and 18th centuries, regulated by a group of nobles close to the king
known as the First Gentlemen of the Royal Bedchamber.30 Instead of
closely monitoring the playwrights, the First Gentlemen set forth
regulations over their practices. An overseer communicated directly with
the playwrights, giving them an opportunity to have some influence over
the regulations to which they were subjected. The interests that playwrights
sought to have protected by the regulations reflected the conundrum they
faced as upper middle class commoners relying on the support of nobles,
whose social codes of conduct discouraged the appearance of striving for
wealth.31 Comédie-Française playwrights had a strong interest in protecting
their reputations, as the development of one’s career was contingent on
cultivating a reputation as a “man of courtly honor.”32
Comédie-Française playwrights maneuvered to promote interests
correlating to the main droit moral recognized under French law today.
Securing the presentation of one’s play constituted an early disclosure
right, just as controlling the ways in which the theater group presented the
play functioned as an integrity right. After a play finished its initial run, it
became the property of the troupe. However, if a play was revived after its
initial run, the playwright could expect to consult with the troupe on
creative decisions, though he did not receive any of the profits from the
revival.33 Thus, the economic right was separated from the integrity right,
with the latter attaching to the author instead of the work.34 Both the
economic and personality rights of the playwrights were labeled propriété

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Liemer, supra note 19, at 87–88.
Id. at 93, 95.
Id.
Id. at 96–97.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 101.
Id.
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or droits, all of which were owed to the author, “because of their status as
Comédie-Française playwrights.”35 Not only were the droit moral
recognized, they may have been even more important to authors than the
fruits of their economic rights at times. Liemer notes that playwrights
would donate their share of the box office proceeds to charity, in order to
enhance the appearance of quasi-nobility that sustained their reputations.36
In contrast to the ancient Roman and Renaissance analogues to droit
moral, the Comédie-Française norms are directly linked to the
promulgation of intellectual property law during the Revolutionary period.
Nineteen playwrights signed a petition to the National Assembly proposing
specific provisions for theater law, which the chair of the Constitution
Committee, Isaac Le Chapelier, incorporated into a law submitted to the
Assembly.37 The proposals provided that performance of a play by a living
playwright would require his consent, and the playwright’s heirs would
own the work for five years after his death before it entered the public
domain.38 Le Chapelier described an author’s work as “the most personal of
all properties,” “the fruit of a writer’s thought,” and “a property of a type
totally different from other properties.”39 The National Assembly approved
the proposal in 1791, passing the first French intellectual property statute.40
Though the 1791 law gave clearer protection to economic rights than
moral rights, which were not explicitly defined, it enabled playwrights to
sign theater contracts through which they could exercise control over
disclosure, attribution, and the integrity of their work. A 1793 law
expanded the 1791 rights from playwrights to all writers, engravers,
painters and composers. The 1804 Napoleonic Code incorporated both
laws, governing intellectual property in France until the passage of the
1957 statute.41 According to Liemer, the influence of the ComédieFrançaise customs continued to be seen in the judiciary’s interpretation of
these laws. Though post-Revolution judges limited the appearance of
judicial lawmaking in order to differentiate themselves from the ancien
régime, multiple decisions protected droit moral beyond the scope of the
explicit text of the statutes. Liemer argues this is evidence that “an
awareness of the interests protected by le droit moral was already part of

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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the social fabric,” such that judges had a common understanding that
enabled broader applications of the statutory text.42
The conventional account of the development of droit moral focuses
on the impact of European philosophy on French law post-Revolution,
viewing droit d’auteur as one example of the broader debate on property
and personality rights.43 Hegel, conceiving of property as “the embodiment
of personality,” believed that the personhood theory of property was
especially applicable to works of art.44 Under this theory, the fruit of mental
labor contains even more of the author’s personality than the fruits of
physical labor, and must be protected accordingly.45 This implies that the
author does not waive or transfer their moral interest in the work even
when they transfer economic rights, with the result that the moral right
limits the economic right.46
French judicial decisions demonstrating the growing use of moral
rights rationales date back to the early 19th century. An 1814 case
announced the rule, followed consistently thereafter, that “a work sold by
an author to a publisher or a bookseller must bear the author’s name and
must be published as sold or delivered, if the author so desires, provided
that there is no agreement to the contrary.”47 In a later case, author Auguste
Comte sued his publisher for modifying a work without his approval, by
adding a statement making negative comments about Comte to his Cours
de philosophie positive.48 Comte prevailed, as the court ruled that
publishers could not modify a work without formal authorization by the
author. While other European countries adopted statutory codes including
default provisions against forced disclosure of unpublished works, France
refrained from doing so in the 19th century, instead continuing to develop
the moral rights of authors through judicial decision-making.49
In addition to these cases, scholarly debates set forth competing
rationales for the results reached in French courts. According to Russell
DaSilva, the philosophical development of modern droit d’auteur occurred
during three stages beginning in 1793. From 1793 to 1878, the Gastambide
school of thought argued that droit d’auteur was solely a property right.
42. Id. at 112–13.
43. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 9.
44. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread Roses and Copyright, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1542 (1989) (internal
quotation omitted).
45. Id. at 1542, 1549.
46. Id.
47. Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 85–86.
48. Id. at 86.
49. Id. at 90–91.
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The Kantian Renouard school categorized the author’s right as a right of
personality, separate from the property regime.50 During the 1860s, with the
growing support for communism, “personalist” writers opposed the
property characterization and insisted that droit d’auteur was based on a
right of personality.51 In 1872, Andre Morillot published an article
analyzing whether an author’s right of publication was attached to their
person, differentiating moral rights from patrimonial rights on the grounds
that the former are not subject to pecuniary valuation.52 Morillot supported
the personhood theory, by comparing the recognition of real property rights
in literature to “recognizing property rights in human beings, which was
legally impossible lest one were to allow the sale of people into slavery.”53
Less than a decade later, Morillot described the patrimonial and moral
rights of the author as completely distinct and separable, arguing for an
expanded idea of the author’s moral rights that would survive publication.54
Three of the main droit moral claimed today under droit d’auteur appeared
in French jurisprudence by 1880: “droit de divulgation, droit à la paternité,
and droit au respect de l’œuvre.”55
The second stage in the development of modern droit d’auteur, from
1878 to 1902, witnessed growing support for the personalist perspective,
while Pouillet propounded incorporating both the property and personality
approaches into a theory of intellectual property.56 German debates over
authors’ rights became influential across Europe, in particular between
Alfred Gierke and Joseph Kohler. Gierke considered both patrimonial and
moral rights as intertwined parts of one whole57 originating from the
author’s “sphere of personhood.”58 Gierke noted that no other theory
explained the use of the author’s lifespan as the unit defining the duration
of their rights in their work.59 Kohler did not deny the existence of
personality rights, but “insisted on a clear conceptual separation between
alienable rights of authors in their works (copyrights) and inalienable rights
of authors in their personhood (rights of personality).”60

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

DaSilva, supra note 8, at 9–10.
Id. at 9–10.
Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102–03.
DaSilva, supra note 8, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 97.
Id.
Id. at 99.
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Kohler’s approach, in which “droit d’auteur is considered to be a right
of ‘propriété incorporelle’ separable into moral and patrimonial rights,”
was adopted in France during DaSilva’s third period, spanning from 1902
to 1957.61 In 1902, the French Supreme Court recognized dualist theory in
the Lecocq case. Lecocq was a divorce case in which the Court allowed the
inclusion of an author’s rights as marital assets, as their inclusion would not
affect the author’s “ability, ‘inherent in his personhood,’ to modify or
suppress his work.”62 French legal scholars at the time also acknowledged
dualism as the prevailing framework.63
B. Current Protections for Droit Moral
The four major moral rights protected by droit d’auteur include droit
de divulgation (the right of disclosure), droit à la paternité de l’œuvre (the
right of attribution), droit au respect de l’œuvre (the right to claim respect
for the integrity of the work), and droit de repentir ou de retrait (the right
of modification or withdrawal).64 French IP Law L121-1 describes the
rights of attribution and integrity, attaching to the author’s person, as
“perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.” These inalienable moral rights
can be exercised after a work has entered the public domain.65 In contrast,
scholars argue that the withdrawal and modification rights are not
perpetual, unless the author directly transfers those rights to their heirs.66
1. Right of Disclosure
The right of disclosure concerns the author’s right to publish, sell or
unveil the work. The protection of the disclosure right “stems from a belief
that only the artist himself can determine when a work is completed, and
also from a recognition of the fact that public disclosure of a work has a
direct impact on the artist’s reputation.”67 So long as the work is still a
“rough draft,” no person except the author can claim a property right in it.68
Three major cases played a role in the emergence of the disclosure right in
French jurisprudence: Whistler, Camoin, and Rouault.

61. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 11.
62. See Rigamonti, supra note 21, at 104.
63. Id. at 104–105.
64. See Piotraut, supra note 7, at 597.
65. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 5.
66. Piotraut, supra note 7, at 611.
67. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 17.
68. Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French
Law, 16 AM J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1968).
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In the 1891 Whistler case, Lord Eden sued artist James Whistler to
compel the delivery of a portrait of his wife. Lord Eden had commissioned
Whistler to paint the portrait, but Whistler withheld delivery after a
payment dispute. However, Whistler claimed he had not delivered the
portrait because he was not satisfied with the work. The court held that the
artist could not be compelled to deliver a work if he was unsatisfied.69
Whistler’s right to “remain the master of his work” could not be ceded via
contract.70
In 1931, the French judiciary further explored the disclosure right in
Camoin. Charles Camoin was an expressionist painter who filed suit when
paintings which he had destroyed and discarded were restored and placed
for auction by writer Francis Caro.71 The Paris Court of Appeals
emphasized that because the author’s moral right in the work attaches to his
person, “the gesture of the painter who lacerates a painting and throws
away the pieces because he is dissatisfied with his composition does not
impair this right.”72 Caro’s ownership of the physical pieces of the work
was undisputed, but did not extend to Camoin’s moral right “which he
always retains over his work.”73 The court ordered the destruction of the
work according to Camoin’s wishes, a decision criticized by Nast. Nast
argued that the court should have instead ordered the deletion of Camoin’s
signature from the paintings and the prohibition of the use of his name in
connection with sale or exhibition.74 Nast’s solution fails to take into
account the practical obstacles to a post-litigation imposition of anonymity
as well as the underlying theory of moral rights. Under moral rights theory,
the artist’s personality inheres in the work, affording the artist unique
control over certain terms of its existence. If the artist seeks to destroy the
work, court-ordered removal of their name does not accomplish the same
purpose in the eyes of the author.
Rouault addressed the question of determining when an author agrees
to disclose their work. Artist Georges Rouault claimed that his dealer’s
heirs could not auction over 800 of his unfinished paintings. Rouault had
accepted advances from the dealer and stored the paintings on the dealer’s
69. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 18; Judgment of Mar. 20, 1895, Trib. Civ. Seine, [1898] D.P.2. 465;
Judgment of Dec. 2, 1897, Cour d’Appel Paris; Judgment of May 14, 1900, Cass. Civ., [1900] D.P.1.
5000.
70. Sarraute, supra note 69, at 468.
71. Id.; DaSilva, supra note 8, at 18–19; Judgment of Mar. 6, 1931, Cour d’Appel Paris, [1931]
D.P.2. 88.
72. Sarraute, supra note 69, at 468.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 469.
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property, but the court found for the artist, distinguishing between a buyer
who has negotiated to purchase a work after its future completion and a
buyer who has purchased a completed work.75 Critics of the decision note
that the court did not identify criteria for completion, failing to separate the
question of completion from that of disclosure.76 The diversity in authorial
practices would render it difficult to choose a universal criterion, because
even the widely acknowledged symbol of completion, the signature, is not
used by all artists. In Rouault, the court relied on the artist’s testimony that
his work was unfinished.77 While this approach respects the author’s
perspective, it also could enable authors to manipulate circumstances to suit
their desires by denying completion even where their individual practices
would point to the work being finished.
As developed in these early cases, the nature of the disclosure right is
personal, discretionary, and exclusive. An author may exercise this right to
refuse to complete a commissioned work or to deliver a completed work,
though they must pay damages. Once the damages have been paid for such
a refusal, the artist may disclose the work at a future time as they please.78
2. Right to Paternity (Authorship)
The 1957 statute established the author’s right “to have his name, his
status as author, and his work respected.”79 Thus, the author can attach their
name to the work, attach their chosen pseudonym, or produce the work
anonymously. Authors cannot be required to maintain pseudonymity or
anonymity in relation to their work under contract.80 This right also guards
against misattribution, where another person claims the author’s work and
where the author is incorrectly recognized for authorship of someone else’s
work.81
Though some have characterized this right as the simplest droit moral,
debate continues as to whether one can abandon their authorship. Henri
Desbois argues that an author cannot waive authorship, analogizing
authorial paternity to biological paternity, while Pierre Recht casts a
prohibition on the waiver of authorship as itself paternalistic, and

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
478–79.
81.

Id.
DaSilva, supra note 8, at 19–20.
Sarraute, supra note 69, at 470.
DaSilva, supra note 8, at 20.
Id. at 26.
Guille c. Colman, Cour d’Appel, Paris, [1967] Gaz. Pal.1.17; see Sarraute, supra note 69, at
Sarraute, supra note 69, at 478–79.
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unnecessarily protective over authors.82 The boundaries of this right have
also been contested in terms of its inclusion of the author’s reputational
interest. According to the exact text of the 1957 statute, “an author’s right
to be recognized as the creator of his work is not the same as his right to
safeguard his reputation.”83 Sarraute argues that artists could manipulate
courts into guaranteeing higher prices for their works by conflating the
paternity and reputational interests, on the premise that the sale of their
work at low prices harms their reputation.84
3. Right to Respect (Integrity)
The integrity right enables the artist to protect his work against
mutilation once it has been disclosed to the market. While the integrity
right was recognized as far back as the 1870s, its key formulation occurred
in the 1965 Buffet case. Buffet painted different parts of a refrigerator, and
the refrigerator’s owner sought to sell the pieces separately. The court
found for Buffet, who argued the piece was indivisible on the grounds of
the integrity right.85
The integrity right has been applied to protect the artist’s reputation,
with some controversy. To protect his reputation, an artist may exercise the
right to publish a reply to excessive criticism of the artist himself (but not
criticism of the work).86 Further limitations have been created by French
courts, such as the focus on the “material integrity of the work,” which
mandates finding a violation of the integrity right only where the piece has
been physically mutilated.87 In addition, some courts have held the integrity
right does not allow the author to prevent a subsequent owner from
destroying the work. The rationale for this limitation is that total
destruction of a work does not threaten the honor of the artist by falsely
presenting alterations as the artist’s decisions.88
The integrity right is more complicated in the context of adaptations,
where the right of the original author may conflict with the prerogative of
the adapter creating their own work. Authors seek to resolve this conflict
via contracts falling into three categories: (1) contracts authorizing
unconditional adaptation, (2) contracts authorizing all changes and

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

DaSilva, supra note 8, at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
Id. at 33.
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modifications “which do not distort the spirit and character of the original,”
and (3) contracts in which the original author participates in the creative
process of the adaptation.89
4. Rights of Withdrawal and Modification
An author may also elect to withdraw or modify their work after
disclosure based on a “change of conviction.”90 These rights are
conditioned on advance indemnification of the transferee for any resulting
prejudice. Furthermore, if the author chooses to republish the work after
withdrawal, the work must be offered to the original transferee on the terms
of their original contract. While these rights were discussed before the 1957
codification, their exact implications are unclear because they are rarely
exercised. They are limited by both pragmatic and legal challenges, as the
advance indemnification requirement has the effect of restricting the
availability of these rights to authors who can afford to indemnify.91 For
this reason, the withdrawal right has been described by some scholars as
merely a “theoretician’s fantasy.”92 As to the modification right, once the
economic rights have been transferred, the author is only permitted to make
insignificant changes to the work, and the publisher may reject changes that
were not foreseeable at the execution of the contract.93
According to Raymond Sarraute, the withdrawal right does not serve a
useful purpose, because it does not undo the effect of circulating a work.
Sarraute argues
Once a thought is expressed, circulated, criticized, it cannot be erased.
Copies of a book which have been sold cannot be destroyed. The author
who modifies his views actually has only one recourse: to set them forth
in a new work. In this sense every work constitutes a critique of an
author’s previous creations.94

While these observations are forceful, an author may seek to exercise a
critique in the form of silencing, not erasing, the original work rather than
responding to it. If an author’s goal is not to erase a work, but to remove it
from the sphere of public discourse such that the act of removal itself
expresses a unique message, withdrawal might serve a purpose consistent
with broader aims of droit moral. The author can claim paternity over their
89. Sarraute, supra note 69, at 480–82.
90. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 23.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Piotraut, supra note 7, at 608; see also Jane Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative
Overview, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 269, 275–76 (1988–1989).
93. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 25.
94. Sarraute, supra note 69, at 477.
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work; they can reject paternity over another’s work. Using this logic, an
author may (but is not compelled to) submit their work to the public
market, and should be able to remove their work from that market.
Regardless of the potential implications of the withdrawal right, it is
limited to publishing contracts, excluding the fine arts.95
Sarraute notes that “no writer has found it desirable to ask the courts
to assess the indemnity he would be required to pay in advance in order to
secure the chimerical opportunity to attempt to suppress an already
published work.”96 In a case that came close to broaching withdrawal
arguments, the Paris Court of Appeals rejected an author’s argument for
the removal of their signature. The painter Vlaminck erased his signature
from a painting on the grounds that it was a forgery. The court required him
to pay damages, reasoning that if the painting were a forgery, it belonged to
another, and if it were authentic, Vlaminck did not have a moral right of
withdrawal after the sale of the work.97
In recent years, several artists have publicly claimed that they have a
right to destroy their work, and legal commenters have assumed the
existence of a right to destroy without clarifying its philosophical basis.
This discussion contrasts with the historical approach to the withdrawal
right, whose existence has been contested since the early 20th century.98
Under the withdrawal right, the artist can do whatever she wants with the
work, including destruction, once she has withdrawn the work and
compensated the owner. However, claims based on a right to destroy in
recent years follow a different type of reasoning, in which the artist seeks
to protect the integrity of the work through its destruction, bypassing
withdrawal and remuneration.
II. RIGHT TO DESTROY
Over the past several years, multiple French artists have publicly
declared their intentions to exercise a right to destroy their own work. The
right to destroy has seen limited scholarly analysis, because it is rarely
asserted. Its origins go back to the Roman law concept of jus abutendi, in
which destruction was “the most extreme recognized property right” and
served as the boundary against which less extreme rights could be

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 477–78.
Id at 477–78.
Id. at 477.
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evaluated.99 Most academic discussion focuses on an owner’s right to
destroy property they have purchased, rather than an author’s right to
destroy property they have created. This limits the applicability of those
discussions to the droit d’auteur context, as the obligations of an owner to
act as “steward” of a work for the public100 do not apply to an author, who
is considered the “master” of the work. As such, the author’s moral rights
permit them not to disclose their work to the public in the first place, and to
place limits on its distortion post-disclosure.
Much discussion of the right to destroy is also concerned with notions
of efficiency and waste101 that are less relevant to property whose primary
value is in its intellectual and cultural significance, as opposed to finite
natural resources and property used in industry and development. Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz defines destruction as “when an owner’s acts or
omissions eliminate the value of all otherwise valuable future interests in a
durable thing.”102 Economically-oriented definitions of destruction may not
be appropriate for moral rights analysis, but comparisons to economic
contexts are useful in understanding the droit d’auteur right to destroy. The
fact that the exercise of the right to withdrawal, one path to destruction,
requires ex ante indemnification implicates economic analysis in the
intersection of moral and patrimonial rights in practice.
Strahilevitz considers the right to destroy an extreme variation on the
rights to exclude, to use and to control subsequent alienation. Destruction
of an object precludes others from accessing it. For some types of property,
destruction may be the inevitable result of use. Destruction also enables the
destroyer to prevent its future sale in ways of which they do not approve.103
In droit d’auteur, the right to destroy may be an extreme variation on the
right of withdrawal, in which the act of destruction is contingent on
withdrawal from third party ownership and constitutes an existential
withdrawal of the work through physical negation. However, perhaps the
right of withdrawal implicitly precludes destruction, due to the inclusion of
language requiring the author to offer the work to the original owner in the
event the author places the work back on the market. If withdrawal were
limited only to private holding or modification of the work, then
destruction would not be permitted. The right to destroy is also intertwined
with the integrity right, as authors who have sought to destroy have argued
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 785–86 (2005).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 796–807.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
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that it is necessary to preserve the authenticity of their work and their
personality invested in the work. Strahilevitz considers the right to destroy
a useful basis for posing the question “what is the nature of ownership?”
Similarly, destruction adds a unique context to the question “what is the
nature of authorship?”
In the U.S., destruction to make an expressive point has been
permitted where it is supported by strong social norms, such as the burial of
chattel property along with the deceased, a practice approved by funeral
homes.104 Strahilevitz argues that because property owners generally seek
to destroy their property for rational reasons, denying their right to destroy
property that has become “embarrassing, unfashionable, unproductive, or
obsolete threatens the impulses that spur future creation.”105 An owner’s
desire to destroy a piece of property may best serve the public interest, so
that even stewards should be able to destroy.
Stronger arguments for destruction apply to authors. Under moral
rights theory, an author is the best judge of their work’s integrity, and can
judge whether their work has been distorted or allowed to deteriorate to the
point of compromising its meaning and worth. Public sentiment is not a
factor in droit d’auteur, in contrast to the limited American moral rights
framework offered in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990106 which
considers whether a work is of “recognized stature.” Since moral rights
theory is not concerned with economic efficiency, and the author’s
perspective must be respected even where the public wants the work to be
preserved as a matter of cultural history, the author should in theory have
the right to destroy where they see fit.
A more ambiguous question would be the exercise of the right to
destroy a particular work in order to preserve the integrity of the author’s
portfolio as a whole. Do moral rights apply in the aggregate to the artist’s
entire collection? Arguments in the affirmative would add a dimension to
personality theory, in that an author may express their originality through a
body of work, rather than individual works serving as discrete expressions.
If that is the author’s purpose, their rights vis-à-vis individual works should
translate to an entire body of work as well. Were a prominent author to
seek to destroy an entire body of published work, this might run up against
the boundaries of respect for the author’s autonomy. Destruction of an
entire life’s work could be deemed destructive to a broader cultural legacy.

104.
105.
106.

Id. at 801–03.
Id. at 820–21.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (2012) (commonly referred to as “VARA”).

8 SYED - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE RIGHT TO DESTROY UNDER DROIT D’AUTEUR

6/17/16 9:45 AM

521

Perhaps droit d’auteur is premised on the protection of the author, but such
protection could produce the extreme result of eliminating all works
through which an individual has gained the status of author. It would be
difficult to devise a limiting principle without undermining the moral rights
rationale entirely.
Joseph Sax gives greater support to the right of the artist to destroy
their own work as a form of speech, arguing that the artist should be able to
control their legacy to the world.107 However, destruction can be more then
reputational control; it can be its own form of speech. Strahilevitz regards
destruction as the silencing of speech rather than speech in and of itself,
reasoning that an author should respond to their previous works through the
creation of new works, rather than eliminate the work. This approach
reduces the purposes of destruction by assuming the goal of destruction is
to un-ring a bell, a desire that is impossible and disingenuous. The
silencing of speech that an author intends to endure is a real danger where
the person seeking to exercise the destruction right is not the author. But
when the author seeks to destroy their own work, they may do so in order
to send a message whose meaning is contingent on the nature of destruction
as the vehicle of speech, instead of trying to simply erase their previous
message.108 In cases where the author wishes to destroy private,
unpublished works, the denial of that right would have the result of forcing
their speech.109 Similarly, a categorical ban on post-disclosure withdrawal
and destruction by an author results in limiting the realm of gestures
through which an author can speak, a speech restriction of another kind.
A. Recent Examples in France
Several artists have recently threatened to exercise their right to
destroy, but have not filed suit in court. These incidents reveal the right to
destroy as a form of speech, wherein even the threat to destroy the work
carries such weight socially that an author can use it to make a political
statement. On the other hand, some authors may invoke their right to
destroy for economic gains, casting doubt on the degree to which
destruction is established as a purely moral right under droit d’auteur. In
such cases, perhaps the authors are seeking to exercise the withdrawal
right, but framing it in terms of the right to destroy to capture maximum
public attention.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 828–30.
Id. at 834.
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One of the most well-known incidents involving the right to destroy
concerns the sculptor Daniel Buren’s work Les Deux Plateaux, also known
as the Buren Columns. Buren constructed the installation, consisting of a
fountain and a series of columns, outside Paris’s Palais Royal in 1986 on
commission by the French government. In 2007, Buren demanded the
destruction of the columns, citing the right to respect for his work. He
accused the French government of allowing his columns to fall into
disrepair, deteriorating to the point of what he called “state vandalism.”110
The lighting and fountain components of the installation had ceased
functioning seven years earlier.111 According to Buren, for the Ministry of
Culture (whose offices are actually located in the Palais Royal) to allow his
work to reach such a state was tantamount to displaying half of a work of
art in a museum. Buren’s public criticism of the Ministry focused on the
indignity inflicted on his work; he even went so far as to state that the
pavement on Parisian roads was better maintained.112 Buren explained that
the intended visual effect of the work relied on the combination of
columns, electricity, and fountains. Without flowing water, the columns
were reduced to mere “dustbins.”113 The public location of the work added
urgency to the task of maintaining its integrity, as millions of people from
around the world would see the columns in a “half-destroyed” state.114
Buren’s statements were characterized in the press as particularly
strident, but his critique went beyond the assertion that the work’s physical
integrity had been compromised. Buren cast the French government’s
alleged neglect as a political message. While the columns themselves were
originally controversial and detested by Parisians, Buren’s installment
came during a rare moment of bipartisan cooperation in the national
government. Buren viewed his work as a symbol of that bipartisanship. He
said of those who supported the neglect of his work, “[i]n these
commentaries, I can feel the far right reawakening. I see again the old antiLang slogans, the old anti-Semitic insults.”115

110. Daniel Buren Menace de Faire Démolir Ses Colonnes [Daniel Buren Threatens to Demolish
His Columns], 20 MINUTES (Dec. 28, 2007), http://www.20minutes.fr/culture/203391-20071228daniel-buren-menace-faire-demolir-colonnes.
111. John Lichfield, Les Deux Plateaux:Monument to the French malaise?, INDEPENDENT (Jan.
4,
2008),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/les-deux-plateaux-monument-to-thefrench-malaise-768339.html.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 20 MINUTES, supra note 111.
115. Lichfield, supra note 112
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Buren’s arguments in support of the potential exercise of his right to
destroy the columns was two-fold: (1) under the conventional integrity
right line of reasoning, the work had been mutilated by the ravages of time,
and the artist could demand to destroy it in order to protect the work and
his own moral personality within it; and (2) the deterioration of the work
was a purposeful political statement by the far right, which co-opted the
significance of the work according to the artist, hijacking his creation in
order to implicitly convey a political message he found repugnant. In order
to stop the use of his work for such speech, which could be viewed as a
form of misattribution or an infringement of integrity, Buren sought to
assert his own speech by destroying the work.
Buren based his public demands on the right to integrity, stating “an
artist has moral rights over his works . . . . That’s what I am fighting for.”116
While he explicitly stated his desire to destroy the columns, he also noted
that he would prefer the government provide funds to repair the works to
avoid that “most absurd outcome.”117 Thus, Buren threatened the use of his
right to destroy as a rhetorical tool, acknowledging that it was the last
resort. His public campaign was successful. In 2010, the French
government allocated six million euros to restore the columns with Buren’s
approval.118
Buren used droit moral in order to secure funding for his work, but
because of the public nature of the work and the fact that he did not extract
any additional funds for personal use, it seems that Buren’s moral rights
arguments concerning integrity and speech were sincere. In this way, the
Buren Column incident differs from another high profile example of an
artist invoking the right to destroy: Jean-Pierre Raynaud and his Neubauer
sculpture. Raynaud did not seek to destroy his work, but to prevent its
destruction. Looking at the right to destroy as an example of the property
right to exclude, Raynaud’s position represents an alternative way in which
an author can manipulate the right to destroy for his own ends.
The Neubauer car dealership bought a building in which Raynaud had
installed one of his sculptures for a previous owner. The exact location of
the sculpture at the entrance of the building posed a problem for the
dealership, and Neubauer sought to move the sculpture. Under French law,

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. James Mackenzie & Elizabeth Pineau, Paris Palais Royal columns get 6 million euro facelift,
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/08/us-france-sculptureidUSTRE6074AX20100108.
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Neubauer needed Raynaud’s permission to do so.119 Raynaud initially
refused to permit Neubauer to move the statue, then changed his position.
Raynaud stipulated he would approve the destruction on the condition that
Neubauer employed Raynaud’s masons to execute the move, at a cost of
twenty thousand euros.120 Raynaud also requested that if Neubauer sold the
sculpture, Raynaud would receive seventy percent of the payment. To
Neubauer, Raynaud’s assertion of the integrity right in the destruction
context was an attempt to capture double payment for the sculpture.121
Without Raynaud’s permission, Neubauer could neither remove nor destroy
the sculpture, at the risk of paying damages for Raynaud’s moral rights,
unless he could show the removal of the piece was necessary for security
reasons.
While Raynaud exercised his right to integrity to prevent destruction
for financial purposes, and Buren argued for destruction to procure funding
to protect the integrity of his work, another artist threatened to destroy his
work without seeking any remuneration. After the mayor of a French city
painted a sculpture by Alain Mila without his consent, Mila protested the
act, noting that it undermined his work and values.122 Mila found political
overtones in the alteration, observing that the color the mayor painted the
sculpture resembled the color of the notorious conservative party Front
National.123 Mila received the support of the Minister of Culture, Aurélie
Filippetti, who denounced the mayor’s conduct as “a manifest violation of
moral rights and the elementary rules of the intellectual property code and
the protection of patrimony.”124 In response, the mayor denied that the
sculpture was a work of art, dismissing the allegations of political
exploitation of the work by characterizing his decision to paint as a
functional alteration to a non-artistic installation. It is notable that Mila did
not seek compensation, but publicly objected to the non-consensual
recasting of his work into a vehicle for a politician’s expression of partisan
affiliation. While no court has ruled on this issue, in a similar case
involving unauthorized changes to a column by artist Carlos Cruz Diez, the

119. Alice Antheaume, Cette oeuvre d’art n’existe plus . . . [This work of art no longer exists . . . ],
20 MINUTES (Jan. 15. 2008), http://www.20minutes.fr/culture/206355-20080115-oeuvre-art-existe-plus.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Le maire FN de Hayange juge “sinister” une sculpture, il la fait repeindre [The FN mayor of
Hayange
repaints
a
“sinister”
sculpture],
L’EXPRESS
(July
29,
2014),
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/le-maire-fn-de-hayange-juge-sinistre-une-sculpture-il-lafait-repeindre_1562581.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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work’s nature as a piece of art was denied.125 Mila and Diez’s experiences
show that the artists most in danger of having a work of art successfully coopted by a political party are those whose pieces can be redefined as nonartistic according to the predominant aesthetic.
B. Destruction as a Moral Right Outside France
According to Alexandre Pintiaux, Belgian courts decide disputes over
the right to destroy by weighing the various interests of both parties.126 In
one notable case, a mural painted on the wall of a pool deteriorated over
time due to humidity. Restoration would have been costly, so the judge
ordered the destruction of the work instead of restoration. Pintiaux notes
that there is no prevailing rule, as these cases are highly fact-specific.
Although integrity is a moral right, Belgian judges consider “economic and
commercial interests, the importance of the work, the cost of renovation,
the capacity of persons, and obligation to maintain what rests on the
property,” among other factors.127 The criteria for evaluating the subjective
“importance of the work” element remain unclear. Under a moral rights
theory, the importance of the work would be addressed by adhering to the
author’s wishes. It seems that in the Belgian context, the author’s desires
are less compelling than a pragmatic assessment of cost.
Recent actions by graffiti artists in Germany reinforce the appeal of
destruction as a means of enforcing the integrity right. Lutz Henke, cocreator of Berlin’s famous Kreuzberg murals, published an editorial in The
Guardian in December 2014 explaining why he and his partners destroyed
their iconic works by painting over them in black.128 Henke wanted to
clarify to the public that the destruction occurred at the hands of the artists
themselves, as many had assumed developers were responsible.
According to Henke, the meaning and significance of the murals had
changed from the artists’ original intent due to gentrification and
“zombification” in Berlin.129 The murals, created as resistance art, over
time came to be used in advertising for the city. Henke wrote
125. Art à La Roche. Sa sculpture jetée, l’artiste Carlos Cruz-Diez réagit [Art in La Roche. Pier
sculpture, the artist Carlos Cruz-Diez reacts], OUEST-FRANCE (July, 17 2014), http://www.ouestfrance.fr/art-la-roche-sa-sculpture-jetee-lartiste-carlos-cruz-diez-reagit-2705329.
126. Alexandre Pintiaux, Detruie une oeuvre d’art [Destroy a work of art], (July 30, 2014),
http://www.lesoir.be/611990/article/culture/marche-l-art/2014-07-30/detruire-une-oeuvre-d-art.
127. Id.
128. Lutz Henke, Why We Painted over Berlin’s Most Famous Graffiti, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/19/why-we-painted-over-berlin-graffitikreuzberg-murals?CMP=fb_gu.
129. Id.
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Gentrification in Berlin lately doesn’t content itself with destroying
creative spaces. Because it needs its artistic brand to remain attractive, it
tends to artificially reanimate the creativity it has displaced, thus
producing an ‘undead city’. This zombification is threatening to turn
Berlin into a museal city of veneers, the ‘art scene’ preserved as an
amusement park for those who can afford the rising rents.130

While their decision to destroy the work was an attempt to reclaim it as
resistance art, Henke also considered the destruction inevitable. The murals
“were doomed to disappear” from the moment of their inception, because
“it is the nature of street art to occupy space in celebration of its
uncertainty, being aware of its temporality and fleeting existence.”131 The
fulfillment of this destiny at the hands of the artists constitutes a scenario in
which destruction was necessary to prevent the work from being preserved
unnaturally against authorial intent.
Henke destroyed his work without seeking prior legal approval. While
he may have been able to do this because the location of the work
prevented a private owner from excluding Henke’s access, he and his peers
still encountered the risk that the state would intervene in the destruction by
labeling it an act of vandalism. Henke’s exercise of a right to destroy
without formal approval subtly emphasizes the fundamental nature of an
author’s connection to their work; here, public justification of the act is an
afterthought, not a prerequisite.
Henke illuminates the right to destroy as a tool of maintaining the
integrity of a work’s message, particularly difficult to manage where the
medium (street art, graffiti) necessarily places the piece at the mercy of its
environment. Henke also raises a relatively new question for the right to
destroy: How do we conceptualize integrity and destruction in a genre of
art that incorporates the eventual destruction of the work as an inherent
condition of its existence?
C. Art Speech: Manipulation and Covert Censorship
As recent European examples show, authors have publicly stated their
intent to destroy their works under circumstances where they felt that
government actors had appropriated and altered the meaning of their work.
Analyzing art as a discrete category of speech, one can see how even a
minor manipulation of a work could impede an author’s expression.

130.
131.

Id.
Id.
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Edward Eberle argues that art speech is entitled to protection both on
the basis of its uniqueness and its satisfaction of conventional protection
rationales. Eberle defines art speech as “the autonomous use of the artist’s
creative process to make and fashion form, color, symbol, image,
movement or other communication of meaning that is made manifest in a
tangible medium.”132 The special nature of art lies in its availability as a
form of non-verbal communication, which encapsulates non-rational, noncognitive aspects of the human experience excluded by written expression,
and its existence in a private sphere of internal freedom not subject to
traditional social and political regulation.133 Art speech engages the author
and audience in a particular object-subject relationship, a dialogue
characterized by “the flow of sensory, emotional or intuitional data.”134
This process gives art speech particular importance as a space for
imaginative human autonomy and self-definition protected from
government interference for its own set of reasons.
Art speech can also be protected under conventional free speech
rationales. Hegel viewed art as truth revealing, claiming art offered a
medium through which it is possible to present valuable knowledge and
insight, as do other forms of speech.135 Art speech may serve a libertyenhancing purpose linked to both the artist and observer’s human dignity.
The expression of political critique in art speaks to its checking function,
and examples abound of political actors threatened by the ideological
challenges represented in works of art.136 The safety valve speech rationale
also applies to art, which can function as an escape from society or provide
an alternative version of society, thus facilitating the release of tension that
could otherwise manifest in socially destructive behavior.137
The ways in which governments attempt to co-opt art speech and
undermine these values differ depending on numerous historical and
political factors. Under both the Nazi and Soviet regimes, artists were
expected to further dominant state ideologies in their work; those who
refused were held up as “degenerative” and subjected to political

132. Edward J. Eberle, Art and Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 1, 7 (2007).
133. Id. at 4, 6, 9.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Eberle discusses Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the photos of Abu Ghraib abuses, and
Mathieu Kassovitz’s prescient 1995 film on the social inequality and the banlieues of Paris, La Haine,
as examples. See Alan Riding, In France, Artists have Sounded the Warning Bells for Years, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/24/arts/design/in-france-artists-havesounded-the-warning-bells-for-years.html.
137. Id. at 10.
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sanction.138 However, state interference in artistic expression is hardly a
relic of World War II and the Cold War. Agnès Tricoire asks, “Still today,
from Cuba to Syria, from China to Tunisia, how many authors are in prison
for not having served predefined collective interests?”139 The “collective
interest” here refers to art serving a “useful” or propagandistic function.
Non-totalitarian governments may use more subtle methods of coercing
ideological compliance, with the means taken corresponding to the
mechanism140 by which a particular genre of art expresses its meaning.
The distinction between fiction and non-fiction, which in the French
context determines the boundaries of hate speech, reveals an interplay
between the authorial voice and the existence of multiple meanings within
a work that can be extrapolated to the issue of politically appropriated
visual art. Tricoire argues that the law should not protect freedom of
expression for works that incite hatred, such as racist and anti-Semitic
work, but the treatment of objectionable content diverges when expressed
in the realm of non-fiction versus fiction.141 To explain the significance of
the distinction between the two, she uses the criteria of “la polysémie de
l’œuvre,” or the multiplicity of meanings of a work. Following from the
theories of Gautier, Baudelaire, and Flaubert that “the thought of the author
is not that of the characters, nor the narrator,”142 Tricoire asserts that artistic
works have polysemic meanings. In fact, a piece that only has one meaning
would instead be categorized as a single idea, or an advertisement, rather
than an artistic work.143 Narrative fiction, a genre conducive to contrary and
contrarian meanings, is polysemic.144 Since visual art is not categorized
according to the dichotomy of fiction and non-fiction, the question of how
polysemic meaning is constructed and perceived in visual art may be more
obscure.
The example of Alain Mila’s sculpture, painted the color of the Front
National by a city mayor, demonstrates how political coercion can disrupt a
polysemic work of art by reducing its significance to a one-dimensional
political statement. First, when the mayor denies Mila’s sculpture is an

138. Id. at 6, n.32, n.33.
139. Agnès Tricoire, Les Dangers du Relativisme pour la Liberté de l’Art, 121, 138,
http://www.agnestricoire-avocat.fr/.
140. For example, while both a novel and a painting might make use of a pastiche of fantasy and
reality, meaning is constituted in different structures and techniques in a written work than a visual one
and would thus be vulnerable to different types of distortions.
141. Id. at 121.
142. Id. at 135.
143. Id. at 143.
144. Id.
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artistic work at all, he is removing the work from consideration as an object
that carries and expresses multiple meanings. Second, by painting the
sculpture his party’s color, the mayor takes the work hostage, transforming
it to serve his interests. The mayor’s act functions as a way to replace the
original meanings infused by the author. The nonconsensual nature of this
transformation is itself an enactment of the model of extreme right-wing
governance envisioned by the Front National.145 Thus, the mayor does not
just symbolically express a political ideology, he engages in its
methodology through a direct subversion of artistic speech.
The mayor’s alteration resembles the use of popular songs for political
campaigns without permission, which encourages a public identification of
the message of the work and the image of the artist with those of the
political actor. For example, in 2012 Francois Hollande released a
Presidential campaign advertisement set to Jay-Z and Kanye West’s
“N**gas in Paris.”146 The music served to showcase (or some would say,
exploit147) Hollande’s visit to the Parisian suburb Creil, in order to present
an image of the candidate that was appealing to young Black and Arab
voters. A politician on the campaign trail likely does not alter the song
itself, but presents it in a specific context linked to their platform. The artist
may resist the implied association by publicly expressing disapproval and
demanding that the politician cease their use of the work, as happened
repeatedly to Mitt Romney in 2012.148 Even if the politician could not be
legally compelled to stop their use due to the applicable licensing scheme,
the negative attention an artistic rejection would draw to the candidate
ensures some extralegal protection for the offended artist. In contrast, an
artist in Mila’s position must take a more assertive stance to counteract the
invasive use of their work, which goes beyond implied ideological approval
to actual physical transformation.

145. This is a broad characterization, but fitting for an extreme right-wing party that has repeatedly
engaged in Holocaust minimalism and called for the rearmament of French imperialism. See Bruno
Waterfield, Jean-Marie Le Pen Repeats Holocaust Comments in European Parliament, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
25,
2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/5050338/Jean-Marie-Le-Pen-repeatsHolocaust-comments-in-European-Parliament.html.
146. ‘N**gas in Paris’ a Winning Campaign Ad or Offensive ‘Ethnic’ Marketing?, CNN (Apr. 30,
2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-politician-uses-offensive-song/.
147. Ashley Fantz, N**gas in Paris’: A Winning Campaign Ad or Offensive ‘Ethnic’ Marketing?,
CNN.COM (Apr. 30, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/france-politician-usesoffensive-song/.
148. Justin Sullivan, Mitt Romney Asked to Quit Using ‘Eye of the Tiger,’ Among Others,
CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/media/8-politicians-scolded-by-musiciansover-song-use/2/.
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In various ways, the mayor obliterates Mila’s control over the physical
and intellectual contours of his work. Mila is left with few options for
resistance. One path is to publicly contest the alteration and add to the
speech around his work in the public sphere; the other is to repaint the
work according to his authorial voice, restoring his speech in accordance
with his vision. Public contestation of the work serves several purposes, so
long as adequate attention is drawn to the issue. It makes clear that Mila
does not endorse the change to his work, nor its resulting association with
the Front National. In Mila’s case, the distinction between the authorial
voice and other voices in the sculpture as a single entity is less self-evident,
thus increasing the risk that the public will perceive the color alteration as
the voice of the author himself. Farida Shaheed, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, noted in 2013 that
An artwork differs from non-fictional statements, as it provides a far
wider scope for assigning multiple meanings . . . and interpretations
given to an artwork do not necessarily coincide with the author’s
intended meaning. Artistic expressions and creations do not always
carry, and should not be reduced to carrying, a specific message or
information.149

While an audience may attribute meanings to the work that the author did
not intend due to the attenuated nature of the interpretive act, interference
by government actors subverts the unique subject-object relationship and
ensures the audience will misinterpret the work.
Given the singularity of individual sculptures, Mila cannot easily
substitute new works to compensate for what has been done to this
particular work. Whereas novels can be printed in different editions in
various jurisdictions, accompanied by explanatory prefaces conveying the
author’s approval, reproductions of a sculpture do not achieve the same
effect. A reproduction does not occupy the original installation space,
which is part of the work’s context, a component of meaning. The meaning
of a novel is more transportable than that of a sculpture, as its elements can
be reconstituted coherently outside of the physical structure of a specific
edition. The novel itself presumes mass reproduction as the means of
disclosure, in contrast to an individual sculpture. Mila’s public statement in
favor of destruction may be the only effective corrective measure. Even if
Mila does not expect the work to be destroyed, advocating for its
destruction is the most extreme disavowal available to him. Mila’s protest
implicitly asserts the rights of other authors, drawing attention to
149. Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights), The Right to Freedom of
Artistic Expression and Creativity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/34 (Mar. 14, 2013).
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government action that could threaten other artists’ integrity rights and
hopefully disincentivizing future abuses.
If Mila instead were to repaint the work, perhaps the mayor would not
intervene again and Mila would succeed in his restoration. Unless he was
compensated for this labor, Mila would sacrifice a pecuniary interest to
protect a moral interest, undermining the general author’s rights scheme in
which these interests co-exist rather than conflict. Whether or not the
mayor were to impermissibly paint Mila’s sculpture a second time, the very
threat of a second appropriation backed by the financial resources at the
mayor’s disposal highlights Mila’s vulnerability as an artist. Mila would
also risk his restoration being labeled an act of vandalism. The mayor’s use
of public resources and authority to disrupt author’s rights, valuable both to
French citizens as the audience benefiting from artistic creation and to Mila
himself as an author-citizen entitled to the protection of his legal rights,
would constitute an expressive harm.
Actions like those taken against Mila’s sculpture can constitute a
subtle form of censorship in pursuit of “the suppression of political dissent,
the quest for nation-building and pursuit of hegemonic policies.”150 Even
where it is unclear what particular ideology underlies the nonconsensual
alteration of an artist’s public work, the encroaching threat on art speech as
an imaginative zone for the construction of autonomy speaks to a
hegemonic politics that limits cultural expression in the shared public
sphere. Shaheed notes the crucial importance of public space as an artistic
forum, “as it allows people, including marginalized people, to freely
access, enjoy and sometimes contribute to the arts, including in its most
contemporary forms.”151 Political alteration of public art implies a model of
exclusive state ownership of the public sphere, wherein government actors
can avoid transparency by hijacking others’ expression for their messaging
without disclosing their own identities outright.
The Buren column dispute may qualify as a form of covert censorship
according to the Special Rapporteur’s framework, as “financial cuts . . .
against cultural institutions or specific artworks may also be a cover for
censorship.”152 Preferential funding for artists who support the regime in
power, as well as the withdrawal of support for art commissioned by
previous administrations, can reduce the participation of certain artists and
their ideas in the public sphere without triggering public concern as would

150.
151.
152.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
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overt censorship through formal restrictions. In this way, politically
motivated artistic erasure does not have to rise to the level of Taliban or
ISIS-style demolitions to have the damaging effect of restricting speech.
III. PRE-DISCLOSURE DESTRUCTION: WHO OWNS THE ARTIST’S
SPEECH?
Thus far, this discussion of the implications of an author’s quest to
destroy in the context of art speech has focused on post-disclosure
destruction as a reaction to post-disclosure appropriation. What is at stake
when an established author seeks to destroy their work pre-disclosure? The
examples of Franz Kafka and Diego Rivera illuminate how tensions around
author-directed destruction play out pre-disclosure.
Kafka bequeathed his unpublished manuscripts to his friend Max Brod
with the specific instruction that they be destroyed upon his death.153 Brod
rejected this directive by publishing several works in 1935 and, in turn,
bequeathing the rest to Esther Hoffe, eventually leading to a lawsuit over
the ownership of the materials in 2011.154 The dispute was resolved in 2012
in a ruling that transferred ownership to the state of Israel, based on Brod’s
instructions to Hoffe upon his own death.155 Despite the seemingly simple
reasoning for the outcome, the arguments offered by competing parties
broached complex notions of public ownership of Kafka’s artistic legacy
that triumphed over Kafka’s explicit wishes for his work.
Judith Butler catalogues the competing German and Jewish-Israeli
claims to ownership of Kafka’s work, which invoked the German-speaking,
Jewish, Czech-born Kafka’s cultural and linguistic belonging.156 The
National Library of Israel argued Kafka did not belong to Hoffe’s
beneficiaries, but “either to the ‘public good’ or else to the Jewish people,”
two interests treated as identical at times.157 This argument framed Kafka as
a “primarily Jewish writer,” and his writing as a cultural asset of the Jewish
people, presuming Israel to be the representative of the Jewish people.158
The presumption of who represents such a broad identity group is
contestable, as Butler notes this claim denies both the perspective of non-

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Judith Butler, Who Owns Kafka?, 33 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3, 3–8 (2011).
Id. at 2.
Id.
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Israeli Jews and non-Jewish Israelis, implicitly attributing to Israel
stewardship over “all significant Jewish cultural production.”159
Though Kafka was Jewish, the question of whether to categorize his
legacy as exclusively Jewish is significant in the competing claims to his
unpublished work. The German Literature Archive challenged this
proposition, offering an account of Kafka as belonging to the German
language and literature, focusing on the “purity” of Kafka’s German. This
reductive account of his German writing, troubling in its reference to the
concept of German purity, idealized Kafka’s imperfect fluency in German.
It also relied on a concept of belonging which goes against the essence of
much of Kafka’s work, “given the fact that [his] writing charts the
vicissitudes of non-belonging, or of belonging too much.”160 Butler notes
that Kafka was known for his comment on the Jewish people, “My people,
provided that I have one.”161
For an author whose identity fell under multiple categories, and whose
work touched upon a persistent sense of non-belonging, it is remarkable
that competing litigants sought judicial resolution of his primary identity as
the basis for dismissing his own desire for his work’s destruction. Had
Kafka been alive when this dispute took place, perhaps the outcome would
have been different, as the living artist’s rights to their work should counter
the derivative notion of “cultural ownership” constructed by various
groups. Nonetheless, the Kafka example reveals the type of interpretation
that follows from a thwarted pre-disclosure destruction claim for an artist
of significance. Kafka’s heritage and personal beliefs offered ambiguous
evidence over who should inherit from the artist the modern stewardship of
his work, taking precedence over the property-based chain of title. These
competing accounts served political interests, as the victory over which
country could claim Kafka as their own transformed the dispute into a
mechanism of national identity construction. Israel’s legal victory is a
historical one, as its National Library’s custody of the physical manuscripts
confers upon the state the status as Kafka’s symbolic home in the
continuing future. This concept of home is not just based on abstract
association, but on the state’s tangible control over Kafka’s speech vis-àvis his unpublished manuscripts. In this way, the state can control the art
speech of the deceased much as it controls the speech of the living—by
controlling public access.

159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In contrast to Kafka, Diego Rivera initiated the pre-disclosure
destruction of his work in a high-profile dispute with the Rockefeller
family. In 1932, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. commissioned Rivera to paint a
mural in Rockefeller Center.162 The mural was to depict a “Man at the
Crossroads Looking with Hope and High Vision to the Choosing of a New
and Better Future.”163 An openly Communist artist strongly devoted to his
leftist ideals, Rivera initially agreed to paint the image of a soldier, a
worker, and a peasant clasping hands.164 However, after being criticized for
“selling out” by agreeing to paint for the industrialist Rockefellers, Rivera
decided to add the figure of Vladimir Lenin to the mural, saying, “[i]f you
want communism, I will paint communism.”165 In addition, Rivera depicted
the senior Rockefeller “drinking martinis with a harlot and various other
things that were unflattering to the [Rockefeller] family.”166
The Rockefellers repeatedly requested Rivera change his mural, which
had been painted as a fresco and thus could not be moved, leaving only the
choice of alteration or destruction. Nelson Rockefeller wrote to Rivera that
because the mural was in a public place, it risked offending a large number
of people.167 Rivera refused to change the mural, declaring that, “[r]ather
than mutilate the conception, I should prefer the physical destruction of the
conception in its entirety, but preserving, at least, its integrity.”168 In
response, Rockefeller had the mural destroyed. Rivera later recalled that he
had not expected “that a presumably cultured man like Rockefeller would
act upon my words so literally and so savagely” by destroying the work.169
Despite the ambiguity over Rivera’s intentions, he described the
destruction as an act of “cultural vandalism,” much as Buren described the
damage to his columns in Paris.170 Rivera painted a replica of the mural
faithful to his artistic vision in Mexico City, and the reputation of the
Rockefellers as art patrons was diminished by the affair.
The Rivera case gives a unique glimpse into how a powerful patron
can control political content during the process of creating a work, such
162. Allison Keyes, Destroyed by Rockefellers, Mural Trespassed on Political Vision, NPR.ORG
(Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/09/287745199/destroyed-by-rockefellers-mural-trespassedon-political-vision.
163. Biography: Diego Rivera, PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/biography/rockefellers-rivera/.
164. Keyes, supra note 163.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. PBS.ORG, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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that the artist would attempt to reassert control with the most extreme
threat: total destruction. While this threat has worked for artists like Buren,
the question of whether Rivera maintained the integrity of his work is less
clear in light of his later comments casting his threat as a bluff. Rivera
succeeded insofar as resisting the completion and disclosure of a work
going against his political and artistic principles, but the outcome of the
ultimatum may not have been his underlying goal.
The Rockefellers’ action in this case suggests a conflict between
multiple audiences when it comes to the preservation of art speech. Their
reference to possible offense to a segment of the intended audience may
have been pre-textual, but it enabled the patron to occupy the position of
public representative in order to stifle explicitly political art speech that
may have resonated with some portion of the audience. Though the
Rockefellers presented the Center as a public space, it was actually a mixed
private-public space, as their ownership of the eponymous building
effectuated their control of the mural. The Center’s availability to public
traffic did not render it any less of a privately controlled institution. The
Rivera mural highlights the danger of quasi-public spaces, which gain part
of their prominence due to a misleading characterization as public spaces,
yet are susceptible to manipulation by private actors with ownership rights.
Rivera wrote in a letter at the time, “If someone buys the Sistine
Chapel, does he have the authority to destroy it?”171 This comment
discloses Rivera’s perspective on who bears responsibility for the
destruction. Though it was Rivera who initially suggested destruction,
perhaps such a suggestion does not carry conclusive weight in light of the
evident power disparity between the wealthy patron and the artist working
on commission. Unlike the Sistine Chapel, Rivera’s mural was not
disclosed to the public, precluding the opportunity to gain valued historical
status that could have afforded the artist more power. Had Rivera somehow
disclosed his mural, it might have acquired cultural value that could have
given him more control over its fate, in opposition to the Rockefellers.
IV. STREET ART AND THE RIGHT TO DESTROY
Where the choice to destroy is ultimately wielded by the artist, the
context in which destruction takes place shapes the significance of the
destructive act. This applies to the temporal context, as demonstrated by
Kafka and Rivera, as well as the physical context, as discussed with Buren,

171.

Keyes, supra note 163.
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Mila and Henke. The existence of public spaces that serve as “revolving
canvases,” for example, particular walls in Paris famous for their everchanging murals,172 adds an evolving dimension to the debate. For artists
who create their work in such spaces, destruction is presumed. The
inevitability of the destruction of their work is a function of the space’s
shared nature; each artist paints over their predecessor’s work, implicitly
consenting to their successor’s decision to do the same. While their work is
temporarily fixed, possibly satisfying the elements of a copyrightable work
in the short-term, the common recognition of the space as an informal
gallery contributes to the brief lifespan of each work. No artist has a
permanent claim to the canvas; no artist can remove the canvas to control
its exhibition once their work has been created. The development of these
specific locations as displays for high-profile street art could only occur
with the acceptance of the property owners, who may indirectly benefit
from the attention the murals draw but do not have a means to charge
passerby for the pleasure of observing them.
The choice to create a work in such a space is an act of resistance to
the commercialization of street art. While Berlin’s Kreuzberg murals came
to be seen by their creators as casualties to the “zombification” of the
gentrifying city, the works’ prominence relied on their continued existence.
A mural that disappears within a week does not have the opportunity to
become a landmark. Artists who purposely create work in and on spaces
known for their turnover can thus reject attempts to commodify their
expression through the conventional consumption of art. In presenting their
work on public streets, they also dispense with the access fee that private
institutions impose on viewers. Any passerby can observe the work without
pressure (or even the option) to pay the artist or a middleman. The use of
everyday public contexts, such as walls that come to be identified as
displays by virtue of their use as such rather than by the establishment of
formal galleries, rejects the idea that art is circumscribed to elite-controlled
environments. Revolving canvases, defined by the inevitability of the
destruction of the works they host, reflect an anti-elitist democratic

172. The walls framing Radio Marais on Rue Chapon are one example of what I call a public
“revolving canvas.” Street artists paint large-scale murals on two particular walls framing the Radio
Marais building on a nearly weekly basis. The process appears to be formally unregulated but guided
by informal norms of the street art community. Another example of such a space is located on Canal
Saint-Martin, just north of République. The corner wall of an apartment building, overlooking a small
public square, is the site of a variety of murals and graffiti tags, constantly changing and building on
one another. On the rare occasion that the Canal wall is co-opted for commercial purposes, such as
advertisements for music festivals, the next round of street art effectively cuts short the temporary
commercialization and transforms the wall back from a billboard into a public canvas.
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ideology on the meaning of art in relation to the public. This ideology,
though broad and amorphous, is no less political in its nature than the
arguments made by the artists discussed throughout this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
Authors may explicitly claim a right to destroy their work in order to
protect it or embrace the right to destroy through the spaces in which they
create. This distinction exemplifies the varying approaches to the right to
destroy in relation to economic rights. While Buren’s public discourse on
destruction enabled him to secure millions of euros for restoration, other
artists have utilized the theme of destruction to reject the economic benefits
of their work. By implicitly ceding the right to destroy to the next artist to
use the space, they produce their own framework for navigating moral
rights.
The right to destroy may be the artist’s ultimate rhetorical weapon to
defend their work. The artist employing this “nuclear option” may hope its
mere mention will function as a deterrent to protracted conflict, but may
not necessarily intend to exercise it to completion. Notwithstanding the
philosophical and legal bases for an artist’s right to destroy, real examples
demonstrate that the question of who can destroy, or prevent the
destruction of, a work may often be someone besides the artist. The tension
over the ultimate disposition of a work speaks to the many valuable
purposes served by the creation of art speech, as well as the conflicts
arising when its multiple beneficiaries are unequally situated in terms of
political and financial influence.

